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ABSTRACT This paper aims to present an approach to investigate cyber risk perception with use of
recognized psychological models, and to give an overview of state-of-the-art research within the field of
cyber risk perception in general and in the context of themaritime domain. The focus will be on determinative
dimensions within the psychometric paradigm and cognitive biases, and to give recommendations on further
research within these fields. Okoli and Schabram’s eight-step guide to plan, select, extract, and execute a
systematic literature review is used as guidance. The search process resulted in 25 relevant articles which
describes 24 dimensions of cyber risk perception in different online environments. Research within the area
of maritime cyber security is increasing, however, no studies relevant for our literature review were found
within the maritime domain. The nine dimensions in the psychometric model, perceived benefit and the
optimistic bias is presented and discussed in a maritime context. Cyber risk perception is a complex research-
area where both determinative factors and other cognitive processes can be influenced by each other. This
can indicate that the dimensions differ across populations and professions, creating grounds for why context-
specific studies are important. Further research may benefit from more multidisciplinary, descriptive, and
inductive approaches, and contextual studies within maritime cyber risk perception can contribute to develop
targeted tools for risk mitigation to enhance safety at sea.
INDEX TERMS Maritime cyber security, risk perception, human behavior, psychometric paradigm,
cognitive biases, marine safety, risk communication, cyberpsychology.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s maritime operations there is an increasing reliance
on digitalization, integration, automation, and networked-
based systems. This increase in use of technology and con-
nectivitymakes operations at sea vulnerable to cyber risks [1],
[2]. Recent security breaches put humans and the environ-
ment at risk and may generate financial losses for ship-
ping companies [2], [3]. The hack of Maersk shipping lines
in 2017 is one example of such a cyber incident. The ran-
somware attack caused a shutdown of Maersk operations
in 13 international ports and losses of 300 million dol-
lars [4], [5].
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has recog-
nized the urgent need to raise awareness on cyber risks and
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threats, publishing a resolution stating that an approved safety
management system should consider cyber risks [6], [7].
Part of this process is the acknowledgement of cyber secu-
rity as a human behavioral issue, and not just something
the IT-departments should deal with [3], [8]. This is also
substantiated by data indicating that human behavior is a
frequent cause of cyber incidents, maliciously or uninten-
tionally [9]–[12]. Even so, the main causes of cyber inci-
dents occurring are complex, and in the context of maritime
cyber security the humans can be both a vital resource and a
risk [10], [13]. Therefore, it can be of importance to explore
and understand human behavior in order to develop targeted
frameworks, policies, and awareness and training programs
which enable humans as resources while decreasing the cyber
risks [11], [14], [15].
A way to understand human behavior is to investigate their
risk perception to guide directions for developing appropriate
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mitigating measures. Risk perception is believed to be a
significant social and psychological phenomenon, driving
decision-making at various levels in society, and being an
important factor in understanding people’s reaction to tech-
nological risks [16], [17]. People use their subjective percep-
tions to construct their own reality and evaluate risk. How
this happens is based on how information of a specific risk is
communicated, the psychological mechanisms for processing
uncertainty, and pervious experience [16], [18], [19].
Knowledge about what dimensions affect people’s percep-
tion of specific risks (i.e. maritime cyber risks) can be used
to outline tools to target human behavior, like policies, risk
communication, training, and procedures [19]–[21]. Hence,
it may be beneficial to identify the existing research specif-
ically related to what dimensions affect people’s perception
of cyber risks. This can aid future research to address what
tools can be developed to mitigate emerging cyber risks.
To identify what research has already been conducted in this
field, it is necessary to map out relevant papers systemati-
cally. The focus of this article is the psychometric paradigm
and cognitive biases related to cyber risks at the individual
level. In the maritime context, the stakeholders considered
are the users of onboard systems, such as the deck officers,
engineers, able seamen, and other onboard crew.
A. RESEARCH GOALS AND LAYOUT
This article presents a systematic literature review which
purpose is to analyze existing studies and their findings,
to summarize the research efforts regarding cyber risk percep-
tion. This study will answer the following research question:
‘‘What is state-of-the-art research in the field of cyber risk
perception in general, and in the context of the maritime
domain?’’ To achieve this, the structured literature review
aims to answer the following sub-questions:
1. What are the main dimensions within the psychometric
paradigm and cognitive biases related to cyber risk
perception?
2. What is state-of-the-art researchwithin the field ofmar-
itime cyber risk perception, andwhat recommendations
can be given to future research within this field?
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents
background information about maritime cyber security and
risk perception. Section 3 describes the methodology used to
conduct the structured literature review. Section 4 presents
the findings. Section 5 discusses the findings related to the
research questions presented above. Section 6 concludes the
research and provides recommendations for future research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. MARITIME CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER RISKS
The term cyber security can be defined as ‘‘the protection
of cyberspace itself, the electronic information, the ICTs
that support cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their
personal, societal and national capacity, including any of their
interests, either tangible or intangible, that are vulnerable
to attacks originating in cyberspace’’ [22]. This definition
includes users of cyberspace as assets in need of protection.
At sea this is an important aspect since crew safety is crucial.
The following paragraph will outline how cyber security can
be related to safety.
Safety can be seen as the protection of life and health by
the prevention of physical injury caused by damage to assets
or to the environment [23]. Cyber security focuses on threats
that can cause harm through cyberspace, and safety concerns
incidents that can harm the surroundings (e.g., human life and
health, physical assets, and environment). Even though the
focuses of the two fields are different, they intertwine with
each other in the way that safety incidents may have security
impacts, in the same way that security incidents may have
safety impacts [24]. For example, a cyber attack on a vessel’s
power distribution system that leads to a blackout, could have
fatal safety consequences for the crew onboard. Furthermore,
a safety incident, such as a fire or a collision, could leave
onboard systems in an emergency state in which they could
be more vulnerable to cyber risks.
Cyber risk can be defined as a risk that is caused by a threat
that exploits cyberspace, e.g., services, computer systems,
embedded processors and controllers, information in storage
or transit [24]. When talking about cyber risks to systems
onboard ships, it is common to divide the systems into two
categories: Operational Technology (OT) and Information
Technology (IT). The OT-systems onboard vessels are cyber-
physical systems interacting with its surroundings [24], con-
trolling the physical devices and processes onboard, e.g.,
cargo management systems, bridge systems, propulsion and
machinery management, and power control systems. In con-
trast, the IT-systems manage data, e.g., access control sys-
tems, passenger servicing and management systems, public
networks, administrative and crew welfare systems, commu-
nication systems, and ship to shore interfaces [6].
Historically, OT and IT have been stand-alone and sep-
arated systems, but because of the technological develop-
ment and increase in connectivity, IT- and OT-systems are
getting integrated to a larger extent than before. This cre-
ates new vulnerabilities, especially since disruption of the
OT-systems may impose significant risk to the safety of crew
members, the marine environment, the cargo, and the ship
itself [15], [25].
Potential cyber-attacks towards theOT- and IT-systems can
be divided into two main groups: un-targeted cyber-attacks
(when the attacker uses tools and techniques available on the
internet to locate and exploit widespread vulnerabilities) and
targeted cyber-attacks (when the attacker use sophisticated
tools and techniques specifically created for targeting a ship-
ping company or a vessel) [25]. Combined with the increase
in connectivity, the potential cyber-attacks create a whole new
dimension of vulnerabilities towards vessels today. In [26],
the authors give an overview of 46 maritime cyber security
incidents from the last ten years and presents a list of the top
10 cyber threats towards the maritime industry. The incidents
are relatively few, but with large consequences. However,
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their study finds an increase in incidents over the period.
Onboard and onshore IT-systems are most affected, but the
study also identifies manipulation of GPS/GNSS signals and
incidents targeting onboard OT-systems.
In the last decade, research has focused on vulnerabilities
created by increased connectivity and lack of protection mea-
sures in the OT- and IT-systems. There are several incidents
where the GPS-signal to an onboard Electronic Chart Dis-
play and Information System (ECDIS) has been spoofed or
altered. In 2018, a group of researchers did an experiment
where they attacked an Integrated Navigation System (INS)
on a military training vessel with malware through use of an
USB-stick and managed to alter the position of the vessel on
the ECDIS-display [13].
Criminals can also benefit from the vulnerabilities in the
maritime sector [4]. In 2013 the Belgium and Dutch author-
ities reported that members of a criminal group smuggled
drugs through the harbor of Antwerp to the Netherlands.
To do this, they used hackers to access the IT-systems which
controlled the movement and location of containers [27].
A crew connectivity survey from 2018, with 6000 partici-
pating seafarers, reveals that 47% of the seafarers had sailed
on a vessel that has been the target of a cyber-attack [9].
This can indicate that cyber-attacks at sea are happening quite
frequently. However, a lack of a formal reporting system,
or fear of reputation loss due, makes the reports of these
incidents difficult to find [2].
The increase in connectivity and the technical development
creates rapid changes in the maritime working environment
and introduces new cyber vulnerabilities [5]. Therefore, it is
important to make sure that the humans are kept in the
loop [28]. To achieve this, one important aspect might be to
understand how the crew is perceiving cyber risks towards
the onboard systems, and what dimensions that affect these
perceptions [29], [30].
B. RISK PERCEPTION
People use their subjective perception to construct their own
reality and evaluate risk. How this happens is based on the
psychological mechanisms for processing uncertainty, pre-
vious experience, and how information of a specific risk is
communicated [16]. Risk perception can be defined as ‘‘a
brain process where we reconstruct the previously assimi-
lated risk through a subjective judgement’’ [31]. Since the
1970’s researchers have identified a range of perception mod-
els and factors used by society in perceiving and assessing
risk [16], [32]. Research within this field is multidisciplinary,
and there are models of the risk perception process emerging
from engineering, psychology, sociology, culture, and cogni-
tive science [18], [31].
The psychometric paradigm, emerging from the
psychology-field, is an acknowledged model within the field
of risk perception research [31], [32]. The model is used in
many disciplines and widely recognized [20]. It describes
nine dimensions of risk perception, and is based on several
explanatory scales such as new-old, voluntary-unvoluntary,
etc. This scaling and multivariate analysis technique is used
to produce quantitative representations, called ‘‘cognitive
maps’’, of people’s risk attitudes and perceptions, in order
to understand and predict risk responses [19], [21]. The
psychometric model is criticized for using aggregated data,
giving the dimensions a stronger correlation than if they use
raw data [18], [33], [34]. Even so, many studies have used
this approach in studying risk perception across various risky
domains [34]–[36].
The work of Kahneman and Tversky on heuristics and
biases has played an important role in the discussion of risk
perception [37]–[40]. Both the psychometric dimensions and
heuristics may influence certain biases in risk perception.
A recognized and well documented bias is the optimistic bias,
which demonstrates a systematic discrepancy between peo-
ple’s risk perceptions and their actual risk for experiencing
negative or positive events [41]–[45].
Research in perception of cyber risks draws to some extent
on the psychometric paradigm [46], and studies within this
field has increased in recent years [47]. Another emerg-
ing research field within human behavior in cyberspace is
cyberpsychology [30], [48]. This research paradigm applies
psychological theories to explain how individuals interact in
cyberspace, and how new identities are built in cyberspace
through social interactions [49], [50]. The cyberpsychology
paradigm and the risk perception paradigm are studying sub-
jective variables, but they prioritize different variables [51].
Research shows that there is a cross-effect between percep-
tual and/or attitudinal factors in these paradigms, making
the psychometric dimensions affecting online behavior and
vice versa [30]. The next section will outline the research
methodology used in this study, and how relevant literature
was acquired.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study was conducted under the guidance published by
Okoli and Schabram [52]. They present an eight-step guide
to conducting a Systematic Literature Review (SLR), as illus-
trated in Fig. 1. This section will describe the planning,
selection, extraction, and execution stages of this process.
A. PLANNING
To conduct this SLR in line with the purpose outlined by the
research goals and layout, a protocol was created. The proto-
col was first used to conduct a training process, and to reveal
limits and issues to be resolved before the search for relevant
literature was conducted. After this process, the protocol was
developed further, with more detailed criteria for the quality
appraisal, and a table for documenting the search history.
B. SELECTION
1) SEARCHING THE LITERATURE
Relevant papers were detected by passing keywords to the
search field in several digital databases. Because of the
multidisciplinary nature of the research area, the databases
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were chosen to include the range of research fields within
cyber risk perception and themaritime domain. The keywords
were selected to promote the emergence of research results
that would assist in answering the research questions. The
Boolean operators were restricted to AND. An example of
the search strings used is:
‘‘maritime’’ AND ‘‘information security’’ AND ‘‘risk’’
AND ‘‘perception’’




• Web of Science
• SAGE journals
• IEEE Xplore: digital library
• EBSCO (Academic Search Complete, CINAHL Com-
plete, EconLit with Full Text, Psychology and
Behavioural Sciences Collection, Sociology Source
Ultimate)
• Taylor & Francis Online
The following keywords was used when conducting the
search: risk perception, cyber threat, cyber risk, cyber
security, information security, security risk, risk, maritime,
marine, offshore, cyberpsychology, policy. The full list of
search strings is found in the appendix.
The searches were run against the title, keywords or
abstract, depending on the database. No time limitations were
used in the searches, and they were conducted in June 2021.
The results from these searches were filtered through the
practical screening criteria and then the quality appraisal
criteria, presented in the following sections.
C. PRACTICAL SCREENING
To establish which papers should be included in the SLR,
the key inclusion and exclusion criteria used for the practical
screening phase were as follows:
• The paper must be peer-reviewed and published in a
conference proceeding or journal.
• The paper must contain research related to perception of
cyber risks.
• The paper must be written in English.
• Grey literature such as blogs and government documents
are not assessed.
The practical screening in the nine chosen databases iden-
tified 80 articles. Backtracking was done by reading the
reference lists of the identified articles, adding an additional
19 articles to the list.
D. EXTRACTION
1) QUALITY APPRAISAL
After all the potentially eligible articles were chosen in the
practical screen, the next step was to examine the articles
more closely to assess their quality. The following inclusion
and exclusion criteria were chosen to ensure the methodolog-
ical quality of the articles [52]:
FIGURE 1. A systematic guide to literature review development [52].
• The paper must present empirical data related to risk
perception research within the psychometric paradigm,
research developed within this paradigm, or research
related to cognitive biases and risk perception.
• Papers focusing on risk perception research within
other theoretical frameworks than the psychometric
paradigm, e.g., protection motivation theory, are not
included.
• Papers focusing on gender or geographical factors are
not included.
• The purpose of the paper must be within these
classifications:
◦ How policies
◦ should be outlined
◦ Risk communication
◦ Risk mitigation measures or demand for risk miti-
gation
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◦ Prediction of security behavior
When all 99 articles from the practical screening were
tested against the quality criteria, the number of articles was
reduced to 25. The selection process of papers is shown
in Fig. 2, and the rationale for exclusion of studies in Fig. 3.
Number of papers published over time is presented in Fig. 4.
E. DATA EXTRACTION
In this stage, relevant information was systematically taken
from each of the 25 papers that passed the quality appraisal.
The data extraction process was initially tested on 3 studies
before being expanded to include all the papers. The data
from each study were extracted and categorized. The cate-
gories given to the data were as follows:
• Context data: Information about the purpose of the study.
• Methodology: Information about methodology and data
collection methods.
• Research questions: The research questions or hypothe-
sis outlined in the study.
• Qualitative data: Findings and conclusions relevant for
this SLR’s research questions.
F. EXECUTION
The information from the data extraction stage were analyzed
by conducting a qualitative synthesizes of the qualitative and
the quantitative studies selected [52]. Relevant information
about the different dimensions of cyber risk perception were
extracted and synthesized. The product of this process is
presented in the next section.
IV. RESULTS
This section presents the findings linked to the research ques-
tions outlined in research goals and layout.
A. DIMENSIONS OF CYBER RISK PERCEPTION
The 25 articles describe 24 dimensions of cyber risk per-
ception in different online environments. Table 1 presents
an overview of the dimensions and which articles they
appear in as determinate factors. Because of the focus on
the psychometric paradigm and cognitive biases in this SLR
model, this section will further describe the nine dimen-
sions in the psychometric model (voluntariness, immediacy
of risk consequences, knowledge to exposed, knowledge to
science/experts, controllability, catastrophic potential, dread
vs. common, newness, severity of consequences), perceived
benefit, and the optimistic bias [19], [21], [42]. These dimen-
sions also coincide with the most referred dimensions in the
articles.
1) VOLUNTARINESS
To what extent people think they get into risky online situ-
ations voluntarily has been found a negative determinant of
risk perception in seven studies in this review [47], [53]–[58].
It seems that the less voluntary people perceive exposure to a
cyber threat to be, the riskier they perceive the specific threat
FIGURE 2. Selection process of papers.
FIGURE 3. Rationale for exclusion of studies in the quality appraisal
process.
to be. One example is a study of Facebook-users perception of
security and privacy threats [58]. The findings in these studies
provide support for Starr’s [75] notion of people’s risk-benefit
trade-offs, and it may also lead to optimism bias regarding
cyber risks [44].
2) IMMEDIACY OF RISK CONSEQUENCES
Several of the studies investigated if immediacy of risk con-
sequences has an impact on people’s perception of various
cyber risks [36], [47], [57]–[62]. These findings indicate
that the greater the perceived immediacy of cyber risks are,
the higher the perceived risk seems to be. This is consis-
tent with previous work that indicates that perceived risk
is reduced when negative consequences are likely to be
delayed [76].
3) KNOWLEDGE TO EXPOSED
This dimension is investigating to what extent the cyber risks
are known by the persons who are exposed to such risks [19].
The findings indicate that in most cases when people have
knowledge of, and are familiar with the cyber risk in ques-
tion [72], they perceive the risk as lower than if they have
limited knowledge [56], [57], [61], [63]–[65]. In one of the
studies the result was the opposite, but the values were not
statistically significant [58]. In another study, knowledge to
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FIGURE 4. Number of papers published over time.
the exposed was found to be not significant before it was
clustered together with knowledge to science [55].
4) KNOWLEDGE TO SCIENCE/EXPERTS
To what degree people believe cyber risks are known
to experts, or science, affects people’s level of perceived
risk [21], [32]. Three studies in this SLR found this dimen-
sion a determining factor of perceived risk, seeing that
knowledge to experts in general tends to reduce perceived
risk [55], [57], [58]. Findings in two studies of online pri-
vacy risks suggest that people tend to share more infor-
mation online when knowledge to experts is regarded as
high [57], [58].
5) CONTROLLABILITY
To the extent people believe they can control threats
and avoid them from happening, their perception of risk
is reduced [32]. Findings in seven of the studies may
suggest that this can be the case for various cyber
risks [36], [47], [53], [55], [56], [64], [66]. Perceived control
over individual threats was found to be a negative predictor of
perceived risk. It is also indicated that some of these risks can
be seen as controllable as typical lifestyle risks – e.g. smoking
and drinking alcohol [53]. The feeling of control can also be
an influencing factor in optimistic bias [41].
6) CATASTROPHIC POTENTIAL
Three of the studies found catastrophic potential as a positive
determinant for cyber risk perception [47], [54], [58]. This
is consistent with the idea that threats with a larger impact
on a single occasion (catastrophic risk) are perceived riskier
than threats with less impact (chronic risk), which also can be
related to the availability heuristic [19], [72], [73].
7) DREAD VS. COMMON
Dread vs. common measures whether the online risk in
question is something people have learned to live with,
or whether it is a risk they have great dread for [21], [55].
Five of the articles in this review found this dimension to
have great impact on people’s risk perception of various
TABLE 1. Overview of determinate dimensions of risk perception. The
dimensions discussed further are emphasized.
online risks [36], [47], [54], [55], [58], [65]. Dreaded
online risks are identity theft, social engineering, shar-
ing of personal information in social networks and cyber
bullying [36], [54].
8) NEWNESS
If the risks in question are regarded as new or novel, they
tend to be perceived as riskier and less controllable [21]. The
results in two of the studies show that newness, or unfamiliar-
ity, can be a positive determinant for risk perception of online
risks [36], [55]. One of the studies implies that when risks get
older, they may be perceived as more low level, contextual
and concrete [55].
9) SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCES
When risks are perceived to have more severe conse-
quences, they are perceived to be riskier [21]. This is con-
sistent with the results in six of the articles in this review.
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All studies reported high correlation between severity and
risk perception of cyber risks and online activities with
perceived high consequences [47], [56]–[58], [64], [67].
Financial activities, online gambling and sharing personal
information are examples of activities with possible severe
consequences [67].
10) PERCIEVED BENEFIT
Previous research has proven an inverse relationship between
risk and benefit, where high-risk technologies tend to be
perceived low in benefit, and vice versa [77]. This coincides
with the results in four of the studies in this SLR when
looking at the relationship between online risks and bene-
fit [62], [67], [73], [74]. In [74], information technology in
general was perceived as relatively low risk and high benefit
technology. Further, activities related to information technol-
ogy (i.e., sending/receiving email, online gambling, social
networking) display the same inverse relationship between
risk and benefit [67].
11) OPTIMISTIC BIAS
Studies of risk perception have shown that people demon-
strate a strong tendency to interpret ambiguous information
or uncertain situations in a self-serving direction, they have
an ‘‘optimistic bias’’ [41], [78]. Five of the studies found that
people tend to believe others to bemore exposed to cyber risks
then themselves [44], [53], [66], [69], [70]. Some results are
also showing that optimistic bias is influenced by other risk
perception dimensions, like voluntariness, controllability, the
availability heuristic, and the difference between personal and
general risk [44], [53], [70], [72].
B. CYBER RISK PERCEPTION IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN
The search stage of this SLR did not reveal any stud-
ies within cyber risk perception in the maritime domain.
However, research conducted in the area of maritime
cyber security has increased over the last decade, mainly
focusing on emerging cyber risks, investigating people’s
awareness of these risks, and make recommendations
on implementation of cyber security measures [9], [14].
Even so, this is a novel research-field, and have so far
payed little attention to the decision-makers and their
roles [3], [14].
Nonetheless, the recommendations given in literature to
maritime companies on implementing cyber security mea-
sures, may indicate that research within cyber risk percep-
tion should be of interest. The recommendations include
a top-down approach when implementing measures, devel-
opment of an international and holistic cyber security
policy, a tailored education program for the employees
onshore and offshore, development and implementation of
company-specific procedures and risk assessment meth-
ods [1]–[3], [7], [8], [11], [15], [25]. The next section will
discuss how research within cyber risk perception may con-
tribute in the maritime context, and present limitations within
this SLR.
V. DISCUSSION
The increase in connectivity and the technological develop-
ment in the maritime domain make the distinction between
safety and security incidents blurry and introduce new vul-
nerabilities at sea [24]. The crew need to ensure they
don’t lose control over the OT-technology onboard, and
the maritime companies need to protect their IT-systems
to avoid financial losses or loss of valuable information.
In order to facilitate understanding and promote good
security judgement, the maritime domain may be depen-
dent on insight into human behavior and an understand-
ing of how the crew perceive cyber risks to their onboard
systems [46], [47], [79].
Research within the psychometric paradigm and biases
about cyber risk perception elicit some reflections on how this
can contribute to themaritime context. The results in this SLR
show that the dimensions of voluntariness, dread and knowl-
edge are often found to be determinants [47], [55], [64]. This
coincides with the well-known study of Fischhoff et al. [21],
which indicates that society may accept higher levels of risk
with more beneficial activities and tolerate higher risk levels
for voluntary activities. The study also showed that people’s
perceptions of common risks are normally reduced, while
uncommon risks evoke dread. Use of technology are increas-
ing in all professions, and for many people the use of internet
is a common activity [47]. The extent to which the crew have
awareness of the potential consequences of increased connec-
tivity and use of technology can decide if they overestimate
or underestimate the risk of a cyber incident [18]. This also
evokes certain questions: Are the perceived benefits of the
onboard technology so high that the crew accept the level of
risk? Do they see the use of technology as voluntary activities,
or more as something new and involuntary? Is this something
the crew even consider since they are totally dependent on the
OT-technology to function in their daily work? These can be
important questions to answer in the cyber security policy-
making process.
The working environment on board a vessel is considered
quite isolated and confined [80], and the International Con-
vention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) is stating
that the crew are responsible for their own safety, and to
uphold the seaworthiness of their vessel [81]. To achieve this,
the crew are dependent on the onboard systems to be working,
and to have control over the vessel at all times. Controllability
is a common determinant for risk perception [18], [36], [47],
and due to the distinct nature of working at sea, this dimension
can be important. To what extent the crew believe they can
control cyber risks and avoid them from happening, can affect
their level of risk perception. This may also be related to
the dimensions of newness and knowledge to the exposed,
since risks regarded as new or unfamiliar may be perceived
as less controllable [19], [21], [55]. Knowledge about how
the crew are experiencing cyber risks in terms of control-
lability and newness may be essential to develop appro-
priate training, procedures and raise awareness about the
issue [31], [34], [46].
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In a maritime environment, the severity and immediacy
of risk consequences are important because of the limited
resources available [80]. For example, if the vessel is in a
distress situation and the crew need to evacuate, they cannot
just ‘‘leave the building’’. Furthermore, the crew must be
trained in handling emergency situations themselves since a
rescue team can be very far away or not able to reach them at
all. Because of this, the rules and regulations emphasize the
importance of executing frequent risk assessments, training
scenarios, and drilling exercises on board [28], [81], [82].
However, until recently, there has been a lack of focus from
legislation on assessing and training to handle cyber risks on
vessels [2], [25]. This, in combination with the intangible
nature of cyber risks [55], might make it difficult for the
crew to perceive the consequences of such risks towards
their onboard systems. If this is the case, the dimension of
catastrophic potential may also be of importance. The crew
might perceive cyber risks as threats with less impact because
examples of cyber incidents with catastrophic consequences
may not come easily to mind [37], [38], [73].
How the onboard technology is affecting the crew’s safety
is something to consider, since they may not be able to
perceive the risk to themselves, in line with the results show-
ing that people display optimistic bias in relation to cyber
risks [44], [53], [66], [69], [70]. People claim they are less
at risk than their peers in many cases, and to what degree the
crew exhibit unrealistic optimism in relations to cyber risks
can give an indication to how policies should be outlined for
communication purposes, and to predict the demand for risk
mitigation [78], [83], [84].
The dimensions outlined in this SLR give a notion about
how complex the research area of cyber risk perception is,
where both determinative factors and other processes can
influence each other. This also indicates that the dimensions
differ across populations and professions, creating grounds
for context-specific studies within maritime cyber risk per-
ception. Previous research has proven that risk perception
has implications on policy, risk communication and human
behavior [20], [32], [38], [76], [85], making this an important
research area for improving our ability to mitigate risks and
enhance safety at sea.
Even if this SLR did not reveal any studies within maritime
cyber risk perception, the research field of maritime cyber
security is growing, and new research is emerging [2], [3].
However, most of this research lacks a theoretical foundation
and make little use of models. The available literature on
maritime cyber security predominantly applies insights of
cyber security to a maritime context without considering the
particularities of the maritime domain, while the literature
that does, is usually concernedwithmaritimeOT-systems and
technical aspects of cyber security [3], [14], [10], [86].
It is well established that humans play an important role
in cyber security. We have no indications that the situation
should be any different in the maritime domain, and the SLR
also indicates that not much research has been conducted
within human behavior and maritime cyber security. This
motivates research that gives the onboard crew the attention
they deserve regarding this topic [11], [28]. This paper is
a start on such work, where an established model for the
human side of cyber security (i.e., cyber risk perception)
is investigated with the purpose of understanding maritime
cyber security on the premise of the humans operating in the
maritime domain. As the SLR shows, this angle has not been
taken before. Therefore, this paper discusses the possible
implications of the model in a maritime context and indicates
how these approaches can be utilized for further research.
A. LIMITATIONS
Since there is no extensive theory explaining cyber risk per-
ception, there might be other factors relevant in addition to
those presented in this SLR [31]. Because risk perception is
a subjective cognitive process, the dimensions can vary from
population to population, from context to context and from
profession to profession [34], [87]. Limitations are also given
in the studies sampling, where most of the participants was
students, experts or populations chosen for demographic rea-
sons. A weakness may be that some authors are represented
with three or more articles in this SLR, making the total
number of articles somewhat higher than the total number of
studies.
Some of the studies in this SLR question the appropriate-
ness of using a model developed for physical risks to measure
cyber risks, but without going into further details about it.
This topic may call for a greater discussion, and the research
within cyber risk perception might benefit from applying
variables from the cyberpsychology paradigm to understand
the width of how cyberspace is affecting cyber risk perception
and human behavior [30], [48]–[50].
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the decades of risk perception research, it has
uncovered many determinative factors for people’s percep-
tion of various risks [16]. The focus of this SLR has been on
dimensions of cyber risk perception within the psychometric
paradigm and cognitive biases in general, and in the maritime
domain. By use of these recognized psychological models,
humans’ cyber risk perception can be investigated, and tools
for risk mitigation developed. It is important to pay more
attention to human behavior within maritime cyber security,
and to understand how we can enable the humans operating
in the maritime domain.
Further research may benefit from a more descriptive
and inductive approach, to potentially discover new nuances
of the dimensions affecting humans’ perception of cyber
risks. Another aspect to investigate further might be to what
extent the risk perception paradigm and the cyberpsychology
paradigm are interrelated, and how these research fields can
complement each other.
Finally, to investigate what dimensions that are valid in
the maritime domain, further research should focus on how
the maritime crew are perceiving cyber risks. Contextual
studies within the field of maritime cyber risk perception
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may provide new knowledge which can aid the ongoing work
of developing cyber security policies, procedures, education
programs and risk assessment methods.
APPENDIX
Search strings used in the literature search:
‘‘Risk perception’’ AND ‘‘security risk’’ AND ‘‘informa-
tion security’’
‘‘Risk perception’’ AND ‘‘cyber risk’’ AND ‘‘cyber secu-
rity’’
‘‘Risk perception’’ AND ‘‘cyber threats’’
‘‘Risk perception’’ AND ‘‘risk’’ AND ‘‘information secu-
rity’’
‘‘Risk perception’’ AND ‘‘risk’’ AND ‘‘cyber security’’
‘‘Perception of cyber risk’’
‘‘Maritime’’ AND ‘‘Security’’ AND ‘‘risk perception’’
AND ‘‘information’’
‘‘Perception of risk’’ AND ‘‘cyber risk’’
‘‘Perception of risk’’ AND ‘‘cyber threats’’
‘‘Cyber risk’’ AND ‘‘risk perception’’ AND ‘‘policy’’
‘‘Maritime’’ AND ‘‘information security’’ AND ‘‘risk’’
AND ‘‘perception’’
‘‘Risk perception’’ AND ‘‘information security’’
‘‘Maritime’’ AND ‘‘Information security’’ AND ‘‘risk per-
ception’’
‘‘Marine’’ AND ‘‘Cyber risk’’ AND ‘‘risk perception’’
‘‘Risk perception’’ AND ‘‘cyber security’’
‘‘Maritime’’ AND ‘‘cyber risk’’
‘‘Offshore’’ AND ‘‘Cyber risk’’ AND ‘‘risk perception’’
‘‘Offshore’’ AND ‘‘cyber security’’ AND ‘‘risk perception’’
‘‘Cyberpsychology’’ AND ‘‘risk perception’’ AND ‘‘cyber’’
‘‘Cyberpsychology’’ AND ‘‘risk’’ AND ‘‘perception’’
‘‘Cyberpsychology’’ AND ‘‘risk perception’’ AND ‘‘infor-
mation security’’
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